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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial
examples where inputs with imperceptible perturbations mislead DNNs
to incorrect results. Despite the potential risk they bring, adversarial
examples are also valuable for providing insights into the weakness and
blind-spots of DNNs. Thus, the interpretability of a DNN in the adver-
sarial setting aims to explain the rationale behind its decision-making
process and makes deeper understanding which results in better prac-
tical applications. To address this issue, we try to explain adversarial
robustness for deep models from a new perspective of neuron sensitivity
which is measured by neuron behavior variation intensity against benign
and adversarial examples. In this paper, we first draw the close connec-
tion between adversarial robustness and neuron sensitivities, as sensitive
neurons make the most non-trivial contributions to model predictions in
the adversarial setting. Based on that, we further propose to improve ad-
versarial robustness by constraining the similarities of sensitive neurons
between benign and adversarial examples which stabilizes the behaviors
of sensitive neurons towards adversarial noises. Moreover, we demon-
strate that state-of-the-art adversarial training methods improve model
robustness by reducing neuron sensitivities which in turn confirms the
strong connections between adversarial robustness and neuron sensitiv-
ity as well as the effectiveness of using sensitive neurons to build robust
models. Extensive experiments on various datasets demonstrate that our
algorithm effectively achieves excellent results.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Network (DNNs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in
a wide spectrum of areas, including computer vision [20,30], speech recognition
[28] and natural language processing [5,37]. Despite the significant achievements,
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2 Zhang et al.
unfortunately, the emergence of adversarial examples [4,6,11,12,16,36,38], images
containing small perturbations imperceptible to human but extremely mislead-
ing to DNNs, casts a cloud over the recent progress of deep learning. Further,
adversarial examples also pose potential security threats by attacking or mis-
leading the practical deep learning applications like auto-driving and face recog-
nition system, which may cause pecuniary loss or even people death with severe
impairment [21,24,35].
In the past years, plenty of defense methods have been proposed to improve
model robustness to adversarial examples, avoiding the potential danger in real
world applications. These methods can be roughly categorized into adversarial
training [11,22,26], input transformation [8,13,41], elaborately designed model
architectures [2,10,17,23,29] and adversarial example detection [25,27,31,44].
Though challenging to deep learning, from another point of view, adversar-
ial examples are also valuable and beneficial for understanding the behaviors
of DNNs, which is an extremely difficult problem in the literature due to the
myriad of linear and nonlinear operations in the “black-box”. Understanding
adversarial examples provides insights into the weaknesses and blind-spots of
DNNs in adversarial settings, which in turn offers us clues to interpret and build
robust deep learning models. Several studies have been proposed to reveal the
“tip of the iceberg” of model robustness towards adversarial noises. Dong et al.
[7] re-examined the internal representations of DNNs using adversarial examples
and further improved their interpretability with an adversarial training scheme.
Meanwhile, Xu et al. [43] attempted to explore the weakness of models under
adversarial conditions by analyzing the effects of different regions within a spe-
cific image. More recently, Ilyas et al. [15] believed that robust features can be
extracted with the help of adversarially robust deep models.
From a high-level perspective, model robustness to noises can be viewed as
a kind of global insensitivity property [40]. A deep model is able to learn insen-
sitive representations towards adversarial examples, if it behaves stably without
too much performance degeneration when encountering such noises. Thus, by
constraining the differences between clean and adversarial pairs in the penulti-
mate or the logit layer of a DNN, several studies have been proposed to defense
adversarial examples [18,23]. In contrast to them, this paper tries to uncover
the mysteries of model robustness in an adversarial setting from the perspective
of behavior sensitivity in a neuron-wise way. By studying neuron behaviors in
different layers, we reveal insightful clues for model robustness and weakness
from the perspective of neuron sensitivities, which in turn motivate us to intro-
duce a strategy to improve model robustness towards adversarial examples via
stabilizing neuron sensitivities.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We are the first to demonstrate the concept of Neuron Sensitivity that con-
siders the varying intensity of neuron behaviors for adversarial and benign
examples, as a criterion to measure the stability of a DNN in adversarial
settings.
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– Further, we take the first steps to define Sensitive Neuron, a set of neurons
most sensitive to adversarial examples, which we believe may conduct the
most non-trivial contributions to sensitive model behaviors.
– By stabilizing neuron sensitivities towards benign and adversarial examples,
we propose the Sensitive Neuron Stabilizing (SNS) method to improve model
robustness against adversarial noises. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10
and ImageNet empirically demonstrate that such a simple technique signifi-
cantly outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial training strategies.
– Empirical studies on neuron sensitivities in different layers of different deep
models demonstrate that state-of-the-art adversarial training methods im-
prove model robustness mainly by embedding insensitivity to neurons which
in turn confirms the significance of neuron sensitivities towards adversarial
robustness.
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Fig. 1: Our framework of computing Neuron Sensitivity and selecting Sensitive
Neurons. Neuron Sensitivity is measured by neuron behavior variation intensities
against benign example x and the corresponding adversarial example x′. Neurons
with the top-k maximum Neuron Sensitivity on specific layers will be selected
as Sensitive Neurons.
2 Neuron Sensitivity and Sensitive Neuron
Prior studies have shown that different neurons play different roles and pos-
sess different importance for model prediction even arranged in the same layer
[3,7,47]. Inspired by this fact, this section studies the adversarial robustness from
the view of neuron behaviors.
Given a dataset D with data sample x ∈ X and label y ∈ Y, the deep
supervised learning model tries to learn a mapping or classification function F :
X → Y. The model F consists of L serial layers. For the l-th layer Fl, where
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l = 1, . . . ,L, it contains several neurons, which can also be regarded as a neuron
set. We use superscript m to denote the m-th neuron, and satisfying Fml ∈ Fl.
The output of one neuron Fml is equivalent to the m-th channel of the feature
map produced by layer l. For model F , this paper chooses the popular deep
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for the visual recognition task.
2.1 Neuron Sensitivity
The model robustness towards noises can be viewed as a global insensitive be-
havior showing small losses and consistent predictions under noise conditions.
Recall the definition of model robustness to noise in [42], which are derived from
the idea that if two instances are “similar” then their test errors are close, too:
∀xi, xj ∈ D, if ||xi − xj || < ⇒ ‖LF (xi)− LF (xj)‖ ≤ e,
where xi and xj are samples selected randomly from the same dataset D and
LF (·) denotes the loss function. ‖ ·‖ is a distance metric to quantify the distance
between samples and e denotes a small value.
This fact should hold for the benign sample x ∈ D from category y and its
adversarial example x′ ∈ D′. However, in practice, adversarial examples mislead
the non-robust classifier to predict wrong label which is defined as follow:
F (x′) 6= y s.t. ‖x− x′‖ < .
Intuitively, for a model that owns strong robustness, namely, insensitive to
adversarial examples, we expect that the benign sample x and the corresponding
adversarial example x′ share a similar representation in the hidden layers of the
model, leading to similar final predictions as well. Motivated by this intuition,
to understand the adversarial robustness of deep models, one can concentrate
on the deviation of the feature representation in hidden layers between benign
samples and corresponding adversarial examples.
To achieve this goal, we introduce Neuron Sensitivity to interpret the model
sensitivity from the view of neurons inside it. Specifically, given a benign example
xi, where i = 1, . . . ,N, from D and its corresponding adversarial example x
′
i from
D′, we can get the dual pair set D¯ = {(xi, x′i)}, and then calculate the neuron
sensitivity σ as follow:
σ(Fml , D¯) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖Fml (xi)− Fml (x′i)‖1, (1)
where Fml (xi) and F
m
l (x
′
i) respectively represents outputs of neuron F
m
l towards
benign sample xi and corresponding adversarial example x
′
i during the forward
process. Here, we use the L1 norm as the distance metric empirically.
2.2 Sensitive Neuron
Once we have defined Neuron Sensitivity, we can further determine the most
prominent neurons under this criterion and mark them as the Sensitive Neuron
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Ωl as shown below:
Ωl = top-k(Fl, σ), (2)
where top-k(·) represents top k maximum instances of the input set based on
a certain metric, such as neuron sensitivity σ in this case, which means Ωl is a
subset of Fl. This can be easily accomplished by traversing the neurons in each
layer and selecting k neurons with the maximal neuron sensitivity according to
Equation 1 for N samples.
Obviously, sensitive neurons in each layer correspond to the vulnerable ones
in a model towards adversarial examples, where more attention should be paid.
Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we mainly focus on understanding the behav-
iors of sensitive neurons against adversarial examples, so that we can establish
connections between neuron sensitivity and model robustness, and further im-
prove the model robustness with sensitive neurons. Figure 1 demonstrates the
basic procedure of computing neuron sensitivity and selecting sensitive neurons.
3 Sensitive Neurons and Adversarial Robustness
Apart from viewing DNNs as a black-box from a high-level viewpoint, it is natu-
ral for us to treat the model as a white-box and make deeper insights into model
adversarial weaknesses from the perspective of sensitive neurons. In this section,
we first explore the strong connections between sensitive neurons and adversarial
robustness. With several empirical analyses, we surprisingly find that sensitive
neurons make the most non-trivial contributions towards model robustness in
the adversarial setting. In the following parts of this section, we first illustrate
the empirical settings, then give our analyses and discussions.
3.1 Empirical Settings
Datasets and models For empirical analyses, we adopt the widely used CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet datasets. CIFAR-10 consists of 60K natural scene color im-
ages with 10 classes of size 32× 32× 3 [19]. We use VGG-16 [34] and ResNet-18
[14] for CIFAR-10. ImageNet contains 14M images with more than 20k classes
[32]. For simplicity, we only choose 200 classes from 1000 in ILSVRC-2012 with
100K and 10k images for training set and test set, respectively. The models we
use for ImageNet are VGG-16 and AlexNet [20].
Adversarial attack and defence methods We apply a diverse set of state-of-
the-art adversarial attack methods including: FGSM [11], Step-LL [22], MI-
FGSM [6] and PGD [26]. The implementation details of these attack methods are
shown as follows: For FGSM and Step-LL, we set  = 8/255. For MI-FGSM and
PGD, we set  = 8/255, step size α = /10 and iteration k = 10. Additionally,
the decay factor µ of MI-FGSM is set to 1.0. We choose `∞ norm to measure
the perturbation magnitude for all attack methods.
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Fig. 2: Neuron similarity of PGD attacked adversarial examples from 10 different
target labels with VGG-16 Vanilla model on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) shows
the Jaccard index of Γ y and ΩyL−1 of PGD attack. High similarities between
sensitive neurons and important neurons indicate that sensitive neurons uncover
the strongest weakness for deep models. Subfigure (b) shows the total Jaccard
index and average pair Jaccard index of sensitive neuron sets Ω1l , . . . , Ω
10
l . The
results indicate that adversarial examples with different target labels tend to
share the same flaws of bottom layers, while utilize different fragile neurons in
the top layers.
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Fig. 3: (a) Sensitive neurons behavior study using suppression coefficient β on
CIFAR-10 with VGG-16 Vanilla model. As shown in Subfigure (a), the contrast
change of clean accuracy and adversarial accuracy proves the trade-off between
adversarial robustness and clean accuracy. Subfigure (b) shows the VGG-16
model trained using Equation 10 on CIFAR-10 when applying top-k layers. SNS
training with layers from conv8 to conv13 enjoys the strongest model against all
kinds of attacks.
As for adversarial defense models, we choose the state-of-the-art defense
methods including naive adversarial training (NAT) [22], PGD-based adversarial
training (PAT) [26], ensemble adversarial training (EAT) [39] and adversarial
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logit pairing (ALP) [18]. Among these methods, EAT achieved No.1 in round 1
in NeurIPS 2017 adversarial defense competition.
3.2 Sensitive Neurons Contribute Most to Model Predictions in
Adversarial Setting
We first analyze the behaviors and contributions of sensitive neurons to model
robustness in adversarial setting. In order to compute the contribution of neu-
rons towards prediction, we borrow the idea of calculating the contribution from
representation of penultimate layer FL−1 to logits from [9]: for an input adver-
sarial example x′ with predicted class y we can select the important neurons Π
by:
Πy(x′) = top-k(FL−1, ϕ), (3)
where metric ϕ(FmL−1, x
′, y) measures the direct contribution from the output of
FmL−1 to the logit of target class y. And it can be described as below:
ϕ(FmL−1, x
′, y) = FmL−1(x
′) ·Wmy, (4)
where Wmy is the linear layer mapping from m-th representations to y-th logit.
Obviously, the important neurons from penultimate layer denote those units that
contribute greatest to the model prediction (target logit) for sample x′.
As important neurons are designed for single adversarial image, we further
extend the idea from one adversarial example image to one adversarial example
set D′ for a specific target class y:
Γ y = top-k(FL−1, ρ), (5)
where metric ρ means the total score of weighted voting by important neu-
rons Πy(x1), ...,Π
y(xN) computed with respect to each adversarial image in D
′.
Specifically, important neurons for image xi with higher rank will have larger
voting weight. In our experiment, we choose top-20 important neurons for adver-
sarial example set D′ and also select the top-20 sensitive neurons for comparison.
For VGG-16 model, we investigate the neurons from pool5 layer.
Then, we utilize the Jaccard index as the metric to quantify the overlaps
and similarities between important neurons and sensitive neurons for the same
adversarial example set of a specific target class y from penultimate layer:
J(ΩyL−1, Γ
y) =
|ΩyL−1 ∩ Γ y|
|ΩyL−1 ∪ Γ y|
, (6)
where ΩyL−1 and Γ
y respectively represents the top-k sensitive neuron set and
important neuron set for targeted adversarial example set of label y, and the
notion | · | denotes the size of set.
As shown in Figure 2 (a), for target labels ranging from 0 to 9, overlap rates
of two sets are very high, which indicates that sensitive neurons and important
8 Zhang et al.
(a) Neuron 430
(b) Neuron 321
(c) Neuron 114
Fig. 4: Image segmentation results of sensitive neurons on benign (top line) and
adversarial examples (bottom line). (a), (b) and (c) represent sensitive neuron
430, 321 and 114 in the pool5 layer of VGG-16 Vanilla model on ImageNet,
respectively. After adversarial attack, sensitive neurons tend to pay more atten-
tion to the noisy backgrounds and other meaningless regions, compared to their
subtle detection regions on benign examples.
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(a) Neuron 201
(b) Neuron 32
(c) Neuron 282
Fig. 5: Image segmentation results of vanilla neurons on benign (top line) and
adversarial examples (bottom line). (a), (b) and (c) represent vanilla neuron 201,
32 and 282 in the pool5 layer of VGG-16 Vanilla model on ImageNet, respec-
tively. The Region of Interests for vanilla neurons show almost no differences
between benign and adversarial examples.
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neurons are quite similar. In other words, sensitive neurons make the most non-
trivial contributions to model predictions in adversarial settings and uncover the
strongest model weakness.
We further explore the behaviors of sensitive neurons in adversarial settings
by showing what they detect during inference through visualization studies. Fol-
lowing the work in [47], we investigate the region of interest for different neurons
(e.g., sensitive neurons and vanilla ones) on ImageNet with VGG-16 using the
image segmentation based method. Due to the limited space, we only show top-
3 most typical neurons of each set, i.e., the sensitive neurons with the highest
sensitivity and vanilla neurons with the lowest sensitivity. For each neuron, we
first find top-5 images with the highest activation in the benign sample set and
then visualize image segmentation results of them and their corresponding ad-
versarial examples generated by PGD attack. According to visualization results
in Figure 4, after the adversarial attack, sensitive neurons tend to pay more at-
tention to noisy backgrounds and other meaningless regions, compared to their
subtle detection regions on benign examples. However, as shown in Figure 5, im-
age segmentation results of vanilla neurons show almost no differences between
benign and adversarial examples. With the above observation, we can double
confirm the conclusion that sensitive neurons are more sensitive to adversarial
noises and play critical roles to model’s final decisions in the adversarial set-
ting. Experimental results of VGG-16 on CIFAR-10 and AlexNet on ImageNet
reported in the Supplementary Material convey the same conclusion.
3.3 Sensitive Neurons Reveal Vulnerable Directions to Adversarial
Weakness
We further explore characteristics of sensitive neurons at layers of different
depths. PGD method is used to generate targeted adversarial examples on CIFAR-
10 with VGG-16. For each class in CIFAR-10, 9000 adversarial samples are gen-
erated leading to 9000 corresponding dual pairs, which will be used to select
sensitive neurons set Ω1l , . . . , Ω
Y
l , where l denotes the index of layer we use and
Y is 10 in this case. We adopt the symbol y to stand for the target label index,
i.e., y = 1, . . . ,Y. To measure the similarity of these sets in one specific layer l,
we utilize the following two metrics:
Average pair Jaccard index is used to represent the average case of the overlap
between two different sets in layer l, which is defined as follow:
Javg(Ω
1
l , . . . , Ω
Y
l ) =
1
M
y 6=y′∑
1≤y,y′≤Y
J(Ωyl , Ω
y′
l ), (7)
where M denotes the total pair number and J is the standard Jaccard index
function.
Total Jaccard index is introduced to simultaneously measure the common
similarity of all sensitive neuron sets Ωyl in layer l. Specifically, it can be char-
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acterized by the common overlap of these sets:
Jtotal(Ω
1
l , . . . , Ω
Y
l ) =
|⋂Yy=1Ωyl |
|⋃Yy=1Ωyl | . (8)
As shown in Figure 2 (b), we draw a very important observation that the
sensitive neurons in different target set vary a lot in the top layers, but have
high similarities in the bottom layers, though they are attacked by adversarial
examples with different target labels. The reason may lie in the hierarchical
information processing structure of DNNs, since bottom layers focus on common
low-level features, e.g., edges and textures, while top layers care more about high-
level semantic features to specific classes [45]. This interesting finding indicates
that different targeted adversarial examples tend to share the same flaws of
bottom layers, while utilizing different fragile neurons in the top layers. Moreover,
according to the results, the most sensitive neuron of the linear layer for each
target set exactly corresponds to the targeted attack label. This uncovers the
essence of targeted adversarial attacks that these elaborately designed noises
perform the adversarial attack by increasing the logits of the target label, which
is consistent with the goal of targeted attack: increasing the probability of target
label. In conclusion, sensitive neurons effectively reveal vulnerable directions to
adversarial weakness, which are the severe flaws leveraged by adversarial attacks.
More results can be found in the Supplementary Material.
3.4 Sensitive Neurons Convey Strong Semantic Information
As we have moved so far, we prefer to move further to give more insights about
the roles of sensitive neurons. Prior studies have shown the ability to use sup-
pression and ablation skills to study individual unit functions within a model
[47,48]. Thus, in this section, we try to suppress the outputs of top-10% sensitive
neurons by multiplying them with a coefficient β after activation (Vanilla model
is obtained when β=1.0).
As shown in Figure 3 (a), at the beginning, with the decreasing of β from
1.0, the adversarial robustness increases, while the clean example accuracy drops
drastically. The model robustness nearly reaches the best when β is around 0.85.
After that, when we continue to decrease the value of β, unfortunately, the model
performance collapses in terms of both robustness and clean accuracy, when
β reaches about 0.7. From the figure, we can conclude that: (1) there indeed
exists a trade-off between robustness and accuracy [40]. (2) Sensitive neurons
are responsible for both clean accuracy and robustness, indicating that they can
extract strong semantic features for deep models, and will hurt model predictions
a lot when suppressed.
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Fig. 6: Neuron sensitivity under PGD attack of all neurons on different layers
(conv1, conv4, conv7 and conv13 from Subfigure (a) to (d)) with Vanilla and PAT
trained VGG-16 on CIFAR-10. The neuron sensitivities for almost all neurons
in all layers drop significantly on PAT, compared to the Vanilla model.
4 Improving Robustness with Sensitive Neurons
We have demonstrated the close connections between neuron sensitivity and ad-
versarial robustness, as well as the basic properties of sensitive neurons in deep
models. With the above observations and conclusions, it is natural to improve
model robustness by stabilizing those sensitive neurons. Therefore, in this sec-
tion, we first try to explore the reasons why state-of-the-art adversarial training
strategies achieve strong robustness from the view of sensitive neurons. Then, we
come up with a strategy called Sensitive Neuron Stabilizing (SNS) to alleviate
the hazard brought by adversarial examples and improve model robustness by
reducing the sensitivity of sensitive neurons. As the Sensitive Neuron are related
to the used dataset and the applied adversarial attack method, we decide to use
the one of the most powerful attack method PGD and the used training set to
generate the adversarial examples.
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(b) Fog
Fig. 7: Mean values of neuron sensitivities of sensitive neurons on all convolu-
tional layers with Vanilla and PAT trained VGG-16 models on CIFAR-10. Sub-
figure (a) to (b) represent the situation of PGD, Fog, respectively. There exists
a strong connection between neuron sensitivities and model accuracy towards
noises.
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Fig. 8: Neuron sensitivity under PGD attack of sensitive neurons with Vanilla,
PAT and SNSadvsen trained VGG-16 models on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) to (b)
represent neuron sensitivities of all neurons on conv10 layer and the mean val-
ues of neuron sensitivities for all convolutional layers, respectively. Our method
dramatically decreases the neuron sensitivity and achieves better results than
PAT.
To begin with, we use the PGD white-box attack and training set to generate
sufficient dual pairs (x, x′). Next, we calculate the Neuron Sensitivity and obtain
the Sensitive Neuron of each layer.
4.1 Adversarial Training Builds Robust Models by Reducing
Neuron Sensitivities
With the increasing concerns of adversarial examples to model robustness, plenty
of adversarial defense methods have been proposed including adversarial train-
ing, input transformation, etc. However, as discussed in [1], most of these defense
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strategies just give a false sense of safety, which could be attacked easily through
obfuscated gradient circumvent. Whereas, adversarial training based methods,
which augment training data with adversarial examples, are relatively immune
to these attacks and achieve the most robust models so far. Based on that, a
number of works have been proposed to study and explain the essence of adver-
sarial training to model robustness. Goodfellow et al. [11] first introduced the
adversarial training strategy to defense adversarial attack by somewhat reducing
the linearity for high-dimensional DNNs. Shaham et al. [33] tried to explain the
performance of adversarial training from the view of robust optimization theory,
which improves model robustness by increasing local stability.
Different from them, in this part, attempts have been made to interpret
adversarial training from the perspective of neuron sensitivity. One important
take-away is: adversarial training improves model robustness by embedding rep-
resentation insensitivities.
To demonstrate this point, at the beginning, we respectively trained a Vanilla
and a PGD-based adversarial training (PAT) model using VGG-16 on CIFAR-
10. The white-box PGD, FGSM, Step-LL and MI-FGSM are applied as the
attack method. Then, for a specific layer, we can rank its neurons according to
their sensitivities. As shown in Figure 6, all neurons are extremely insensitive to
adversarial examples on PAT, compared with the Vanilla model on each layer.
This observation clarifies the reason why adversarial training methods are in-
sensitive or robust to adversarial noises. Meanwhile, we witness one interesting
phenomenon that the differences of the neuron sensitivity between Vanilla and
PAT for the top 10% of the neurons are distinctly larger than that of others,
which proves the rationality of sensitive neurons. In other words, sensitive neu-
rons are significant indicators to represent model behaviors in the adversarial
setting between benign and adversarial examples.
After neuron-wise analysis, further investigation has been made in an overall
view by different layers. As shown in Figure 7 (a), under PGD attack, PAT ob-
tains the lower sensitivity value of sensitive neurons (top 10%) with big margins
compared with Vanilla model, which explains why PAT enjoys much higher ad-
versarial robustness. Moreover, we find a very interesting phenomenon in Figure
7 (b) that in fog noise setting the neuron sensitivity values of PAT are higher
than that of Vanilla model in most layers. Actually, the accuracy of Vanilla and
PAT on fog noise is 33.64% and 55.64% respectively, which further confirms that
the neuron sensitivity serves as a distinct indicator of model robustness.
In this point of view, we believe that, with the help of stable neurons, adver-
sarial noises are more easily absorbed and filtered during the forward propagation
process, due to the insensitive hidden representations, which in turn promises
consistent model behaviors and strong robustness.
4.2 Training Adversarially Robust Models via Sensitive Neurons
Stabilizing
Motivated by our observations, a straightforward idea for improving model ro-
bustness is to force the sensitive neurons of benign and adversarial ones to behave
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similarly. In other words, we try to stabilize those sensitive neurons, and thus the
whole model will be insensitive to adversarial examples. The Sensitive Neurons
Stabilizing (SNS for short) can be easily accomplished by directly adding a loss
term to measure the similarities of sensitive neurons behaviors when inputting
the clean and adversarial examples:
Lsns(x, x′; θ) =
l∈S∑
l
Fml ∈Ωl∑
m
‖Fml (x)− Fml (x′)‖1, (9)
where S denotes the indices of selected layers and Ωl denotes sensitive neuron
set of layer l.
Given clean examples x and adversarial examples x′, our SNS method mini-
mizes the following loss:
Lcls(x, y; θ) + λ · Lsns(x, x′; θ), (10)
where Lcls denotes the cross entropy loss and Lsns represents the similarity of
sensitive neurons’ behaviors in some specific layers for the dual pair (x, x′). Here,
λ is a hyper-parameter balancing the two loss terms.
Algorithm 1 Improve model robustness with Sensitive Neurons Stabilizing
Input: training set D with N samples, Vanilla model FV anilla
Output: robust model FRobust
Hyper-parameter: λ, batchsize B and epoch E
1: Use PGD white-box attack to generate dual pair set D¯ = {(xi, x′i) | i = 1, . . . ,N}
and select Sensitive Neurons.
2: for E training epochs do
3: for bN
B
c mini-batch numbers do
4: optimize the current model by
Ladv(x, x′, y; θ) + λLsns(x, x′; θ)
5: end for
6: end for
As there are numerous layers in the architecture of deep models, a question
emerges: do we need to select all layers when performing SNS training? Since
different hidden layers behave variously from each other [46], it seems necessary
to come up with a strategy for choosing the desired hidden layers. As discussed
before that sensitive neurons that are more close to predictions reveal more ad-
versarial weaknesses towards adversarial attacks. Meanwhile, they contain more
high-level semantic information contributing to the model’s final decisions. Thus,
we conduct experiments of training models with top-k hidden layers to figure
out the choices for layer selection. Namely, parameters of the bottom several
layers are locked during finetuning. As illustrated in Figure 3 (b), using layers
from conv8 to conv13 reaches the most adversarially robust model. Thus, the
rest of the paper follows this guidance.
Firstly, we try to test model robustness by using our proposed SNS on
CIFAR-10 with VGG-16. We adopt Step-LL, MI-FGSM, FGSM and PGD as
16 Zhang et al.
Table 1: Experiments result of adversarial robustness test on CIFAR-10 with
VGG-16. Our strategy outperforms all comparison methods towards adversarial
examples generated by different attack methods.
Model Clean
Targeted Attack Untargeted Attack
Step-LL MI-FGSM PGD FGSM
Vanilla 89.19% 7.99% 3.10% 0.00% 4.88%
NAT 88.59% 39.57% 21.12% 1.05% 26.72%
EAT 87.84% 41.88% 35.72% 16.24% 27.87%
PAT 85.16% 74.94% 76.36% 46.04% 46.96%
ALP 81.41% 71.06% 76.90% 44.76% 46.80%
SNSclssen 91.29% 48.89% 36.52% 16.95% 42.68%
SNSclsall 90.72% 47.08% 32.33% 9.27% 35.27%
SNSadvsen 87.24% 77.08% 79.53% 48.47% 49.16%
Table 2: Experiments result of adversarial robustness test on ImageNet with
AlexNet. Our strategy outperforms all comparison methods towards adversarial
examples generated by different attack methods.
Model Clean
Targeted Attack Untargeted Attack
Step-LL MI-FGSM PGD FGSM
Vanilla 57.70% 34.10% 33.75% 10.50% 13.85%
NAT 55.46% 34.23% 33.79% 9.07% 12.63%
EAT 56.13% 38.77% 38.54% 13.01% 15.77%
PAT 55.10% 49.28% 50.89% 26.44% 27.83%
SNSclssen 59.10% 37.01% 37.28% 13.15% 16.47%
SNSadvsen 56.35% 51.14% 53.05% 28.53% 30.72%
the adversarial attack methods in this section. We first train model with the
loss in Equation 10 using top-10% sensitive neurons, and from Table 1 we can
see that our model (SNSclssen) outperforms NAT and EAT model for white-box
adversarial defense in all cases, which indicates the effectiveness of improving
model robustness by constraining sensitive neurons.
Secondly, to examine the superiority of using sensitive neurons compared
with all neurons for improving model robustness, we conduct a comparative
experiment. As shown in Table 1 (SNSclsall), the model’s adversarial robustness
decreases to some extent, which means that sensitive neurons are more critical
for adversarial robustness, while constraining all neurons may somewhat lead
to the drop of adversarial robustness. The reason might be that using vanilla
neurons will introduce meaningless gradients, which is harmful for improving the
model’s robustness.
Finally, in order to further improve model robustness, we introduce another
version of sensitive neurons stabilizing loss, which adopts adversarial training
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loss instead of normal cross entropy loss:
Ladv(x, x′, y; θ) + λLsns(x, x′; θ), (11)
where Ladv denotes the adversarial training loss. The whole training process is
demonstrated in Algorithm 1.
According to [18], ALP is implemented on the basis of PGD-based adversar-
ial training. Therefore, for fair comparisons, we use the adversarial version of
SNS here as SNSadvsen. According to the result (SNS
adv
sen) in Table 1, our method
outperforms all other comparison methods including PAT and ALP, indicat-
ing that SNS builds strong models towards adversarial examples. However, we
notice that ALP and PAT decrease the model performance on clean examples
drastically. Meanwhile, ALP also shows weak adversarial defense ability in most
cases compared with PAT. These observations prove the importance of using
sensitive neurons for improving model robustness compared with logits (ALP).
Furthermore, stabilizing sensitive neurons also serves as a regularization term
when used with adversarial training loss to alleviate clean example accuracy
drops, since most adversarial training strategies build models with relatively low
clean example accuracy. The corresponding experimental results on ImageNet
with AlexNet are shown in Table 2.
Since our model (SNSadvsen) reaches the best performance of adversarial robust-
ness, we make further analyses on how the neuron sensitivity changes after SNS
training. Figure 8 (a) shows the neuron sensitivity of all neurons in conv10 layer
after SNS training. It is obvious that our method dramatically suppresses the
neuron sensitivity and achieves better results than PAT, which demonstrates
that SNS loss term significantly contributes to better adversarial robustness.
Further, our method requires much fewer epochs compared to PAT, leading to
less time consumption. As illustrated in Figure 8 (b), interestingly, the sensi-
tivities of neurons on layer conv8 to conv13 have a significant change, which
exactly match layers we use in SNS to train the model. Meanwhile, the neuron
sensitivities in bottom layers stay high since they were fixed and only conv8 to
conv13 were finetuned during training.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to interpret and improve adversarial robustness for
deep models from a new perspective of neuron sensitivity which is measured
by neuron behavior variation intensity against benign and adversarial examples.
By thorough analyses, we first draw the close relationship between adversarial
robustness and neuron sensitivities, as sensitive neurons make the most non-
trivial contribution to model predictions in the adversarial setting. Based on
that conclusion, we further propose to improve model robustness against adver-
sarial examples by sensitive neurons stabilizing which constrains the behaviors of
sensitive neurons between benign and adversarial examples. Moreover, state-of-
the-art adversarial training strategies also achieve strong robustness by reducing
neuron sensitivities which in turn confirms the importance of sensitive neurons
18 Zhang et al.
to model robustness in the adversarial setting. Extensive experiments on various
datasets demonstrate that our algorithm effectively achieves excellent results.
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A Empirical Analysis Details
In this section, we will give some details of our methods and measurements used
in the empirical analysis section.
A.1 Weighted Voting Method
In order to select the Important Neurons set Γ y to one adversarial example set D′
for a specific target class y, we apply a weighted voting method ρ. Specifically, an
Important Neurons Πy(xi) contains k1 neurons which are ranked in descending
order by sensitivity. To emphasize their different importances, we give them
different votes from k1 to 1. After the voting process, votes for each neuron will
be counted and the top-k2 of them will be selected. In our experiment, we choose
k1 = k2 = 20.
B More Experiment Results
In this section, we will give more experiment results.
B.1 Sensitive Neurons Reveal Vulnerable Directions to Adversarial
Weakness
In the empirical analysis part, we have demonstrated the finding that sensitive
neurons in different target set vary a lot in the top layers, but have high simi-
larities in the bottom layers using VGG-16 on CIFAR-10. To further confirm it,
we adopt experiment on ImageNet with AlexNet. As there are excessive classes
in ImageNet, we randomly select 10 of them and apply PGD targeted attack to
these target class y to generate adversarial example dataset D′ respectively and
then obtain the sensitive neuron sets Ωyl of each classes, where l ∈ {1, . . . ,L}.
Total Jaccard index and average pair Jaccard index of sensitive neuron set are
computed and the results are shown in Figure 9 which double confirms the con-
clusion.
Moreover, we list the detailed results of sensitive neurons on 10 different
targeted adversarial example sets by layers within VGG-16 on CIFAR-10. Table
3 and Table 4 list the result of several specific layers: conv1, conv4, conv7, conv11,
conv13 and fc. All the results are ranked in descending order by sensitivity.
B.2 Adversarial Training Improves Model Robustness by Reducing
Neuron Sensitivities
In this section, we demonstrate more results about the contributions of sensitive
neurons to adversarial training strategies. As shown in Figure 10, 11, the mean
sensitivity values of sensitive neurons on CIFAR-10 with VGG-16 and ImageNet
with AlexNet using PAT are lower than that of Vanilla model. Then, the result
of ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 is shown in Figure 12. After that, we also show the
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Fig. 9: Neuron similarity of PGD attack for 10 different target labels using
AlexNet on ImageNet. Specifically, the total Jaccard index and average pair
Jaccard index of sensitive neuron sets Ω1l , . . . , Ω
10
l . Classes are randomly se-
lected including: altar, obelisk, triumphal-arch, scorpion, nail, kimono, syringe,
cliff-dwelling, koala and confectionery.
sensitivities of all neurons on different layers of AlexNet on ImageNet in Figure
13. Above results confirm the evidence that adversarial training improves model
robustness by embedding neuron insensitivity.
B.3 Sensitive Neurons contribute Most to Adversarial
Misclassification
In this section, we further demonstrate the result of visualizing receptive fields
of sensitive neurons and vanilla ones in two more models with same process
mentioned before. The comparison of visualization result of sensitive neurons
and vanilla ones on CIFAR-10 with VGG-16 is shown in Figure 14 and 15, re-
spectively. Meanwhile, Figure 16 and 17 demonstrate the result on ImageNet
with AlexNet. From these visualization results, same conclusions can be drawn
as stated before that sensitive neurons contribute most to adversarial misclassi-
fication.
C Implementation Details
C.1 Adversarial Defensive Methods
In this section, the implementation details of SNS and other defensive methods
are given.
SNS. PGD attack is used for generating adversarial example set from train-
ing set, based on which sensitive neurons are selected. Then we train models with
different hyper-parameters on different datasets. On CIFAR-10 with VGG-16,
we use the sensitive neurons from conv8 to conv13 with λ = 5.0 in the training
set. On ImageNet with AlexNet, we use the sensitive neurons from conv3 to
conv5 with λ = 6.0 in the training set.
NAT. Step-LL attack on current training model is used for adversarial exam-
ples generating with  obtained by absolute value of normal distribution N(0, 8)
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(b) Step-LL
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(c) MI-FGSM
                             
 & R Q Y R O X W L R Q D O  / D \ H U  , Q G H [
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $ Y
 H U
 D J
 H 
 1 H
 X U
 R Q
  6
 H Q
 V L
 W L
 Y L
 W \
 9 D Q L O O D
 3 $ 7
(d) Gaussian Noise
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(e) JPEG Compression
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(f) Defocus Blur
Fig. 10: Mean values of neuron sensitivity on sensitive neurons of all convolutional
layers with Vanilla and PAT using VGG-16 on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) to (f)
represent the situation of FGSM, Step-LL, MI-FGSM, Gaussian Noise, JPEG
Compression, Defocus Blur, respectively.
and truncated to [0,16]. Meanwhile, the coefficient ratio adopted for clean and
adversarial examples during the training phase are 1 to 1.
EAT. Experiment settings for EAT are the same for NAT except for the tar-
get models for adversarial example generating. On CIFAR-10, the target models
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(a) PGD
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(b) MI-FGSM
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(c) FGSM
         
 & R Q Y R O X W L R Q D O  / D \ H U  , Q G H [
   
   
   
   
   
 $ Y
 H U
 D J
 H 
 1 H
 X U
 R Q
  6
 H Q
 V L
 W L
 Y L
 W \
 9 D Q L O O D
 3 $ 7
(d) Step-LL
Fig. 11: Mean values of neuron sensitivity on sensitive neurons of all convolutional
layers with Vanilla and PAT using AlexNet on ImageNet. Subfigure (a) to (d)
represent the situation of PGD, MI-FGSM, FGSM, Step-LL, respectively.
are Inception-v2, ResNet-18 and the current training model. As for ImageNet,
the target models are AlexNet, ResNet-18 and the current training model.
PAT. PGD attack on current training model is used for adversarial examples
generating with  = 8, k = 10, α = 0.8. The clean and adversarial examples are
mixed in the ratio of 1 to 1 during the training phase.
ALP. The loss terms of ALP consist of two main parts: adversarial training
loss whose setting is consistent with PAT and logit pairing term which is imple-
mented with L2 loss. The ratio of these two terms during training phase are 2
to 1, namely the coefficient λ of logit pairing term is 0.5.
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(a) PGD
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(b) MI-FGSM
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(c) FGSM
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(d) Step-LL
Fig. 12: Mean values of neuron sensitivity on sensitive neurons of all convolutional
layers with Vanilla and PAT using ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10. Subfigure (a) to (d)
represent the situation of PGD, MI-FGSM, FGSM, Step-LL, respectively.
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(a) conv2
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(b) conv3
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(c) conv4
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(d) conv5
Fig. 13: Neuron sensitivity of all neurons on different layers (conv2, conv3, conv4
and conv5 from subfigure (a) to (d)) with Vanilla and PAT using AlexNet on
ImageNet .
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(a) Neuron 6
(b) Neuron 53
(c) Neuron 74
Fig. 14: Image segmentation results of sensitive neurons on benign (top line) and
adversarial examples (bottom line). (a), (b) and (c) represent sensitive neuron 6,
53 and 74 in the pool2 layer of VGG-16 Vanilla model on CIFAR-10, respectively.
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(a) Neuron 5
(b) Neuron 73
(c) Neuron 45
Fig. 15: Image segmentation results of vanilla neurons on benign (top line) and
adversarial examples (bottom line). (a), (b) and (c) represent vanilla neuron 5, 73
and 45 in the pool2 layer of VGG-16 Vanilla model on CIFAR-10, respectively.
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(a) Neuron 112
(b) Neuron 89
(c) Neuron 136
Fig. 16: Image segmentation results of sensitive neurons on benign (top line) and
adversarial examples (bottom line). (a), (b) and (c) represent sensitive neuron
112, 89 and 136 in the pool3 layer of AlexNet Vanilla model on ImageNet,
respectively.
30 Zhang et al.
(a) Neuron 116
(b) Neuron 32
(c) Neuron 207
Fig. 17: Image segmentation results of vanilla neurons on benign (top line) and
adversarial examples (bottom line). (a), (b) and (c) represent vanilla neuron
116, 32 and 207 in the pool3 layer of AlexNet Vanilla model on ImageNet,
respectively.
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Table 3: Sensitive neurons on 10 targeted adversarial example sets in conv1,
conv4, conv7 and conv11 layer of VGG-16 on CIFAR-10.
Target Label conv1 conv4 conv7 conv11
0
52, 10, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 111,
103, 125, 79,
58, 68, 74,
16, 1, 32
0, 72, 128, 107, 176,
10, 114, 149, 76, 105,
93, 135, 134, 9, 217,
57, 161, 19, 131, 143,
59, 148, 192, 27, 78
504, 124, 184, 428, 364, 312, 202, 264, 133, 138,
272, 257, 342, 232, 66, 119, 381, 359, 161, 224,
127, 165, 308, 336, 25, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 146, 340, 211, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 358
1
10, 52, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 103,
111, 125, 79,
8, 74, 58,
68, 1, 9
0, 9, 128, 57, 149,
118, 72, 217, 114, 134,
7, 10, 43, 107, 143,
105, 161, 176, 76, 135,
131, 169, 93, 19, 148
184, 232, 66, 264, 428, 202, 312, 257, 342, 138,
364, 272, 133, 504, 161, 119, 381, 359, 124, 127,
165, 308, 224, 336, 25, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 146, 234, 340, 211, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 330
2
10, 52, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 125,
111, 103, 79,
58, 1, 74,
8, 82, 16
0, 143, 149, 128, 195,
161, 72, 134, 217, 114,
105, 78, 9, 16, 176,
93, 10, 19, 135, 118,
107, 60, 76, 131, 69
264, 184, 272, 428, 202, 312, 127, 66, 133, 138,
504, 257, 364, 342, 232, 124, 359, 161, 381, 119,
308, 336, 165, 25, 224, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 340, 146, 211, 32, 63, 317, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 368
3
10, 52, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 111,
125, 103, 79,
74, 8, 58,
1, 68, 16
0, 170, 217, 214, 128,
206, 2, 72, 233, 149,
53, 114, 41, 134, 27,
10, 135, 105, 107, 9,
76, 143, 28, 176, 249
184, 312, 428, 202, 264, 272, 232, 364, 381, 359,
138, 257, 133, 66, 504, 342, 124, 127, 119, 161,
165, 336, 308, 224, 25, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 340, 146, 211, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 170
4
10, 52, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 125,
111, 103, 79,
58, 8, 74,
16, 1, 49
0, 19, 149, 176, 154,
43, 223, 72, 214, 128,
93, 105, 148, 57, 217,
114, 143, 10, 24, 135,
192, 59, 9, 107, 161
133, 428, 342, 202, 184, 364, 264, 504, 312, 124,
66, 272, 138, 257, 119, 359, 381, 232, 161, 224,
127, 25, 308, 165, 336, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 211, 146, 340, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 166, 508
5
52, 10, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 111,
125, 103, 79,
58, 8, 74,
1, 16, 49
0, 217, 107, 247, 19,
76, 128, 135, 111, 79,
72, 149, 114, 143, 57,
10, 9, 134, 161, 43,
78, 175, 93, 105, 164
184, 272, 202, 312, 359, 364, 428, 264, 124, 138,
504, 119, 161, 232, 257, 381, 66, 342, 133, 127,
224, 165, 308, 25, 336, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 146, 340, 211, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 209
6
52, 10, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 125,
111, 103, 79,
58, 1, 68,
74, 82, 16
114, 0, 131, 128, 169,
149, 10, 217, 148, 72,
134, 9, 80, 143, 30,
135, 105, 107, 176, 161,
76, 233, 57, 214, 230
138, 133, 161, 428, 364, 264, 184, 257, 202, 272,
312, 66, 504, 232, 359, 342, 127, 381, 119, 124,
308, 165, 224, 336, 25, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 211, 340, 146, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 508
7
52, 10, 14,
55, 15, 25
18, 6, 111,
103, 125, 74,
79, 58, 8,
1, 68, 9
0, 10, 149, 114, 72,
22, 43, 107, 165, 78,
76, 25, 128, 217, 206,
168, 135, 110, 161, 105,
143, 9, 134, 176, 192
342, 119, 428, 184, 312, 264, 202, 364, 66, 133,
138, 257, 381, 165, 272, 359, 504, 232, 161, 124,
127, 308, 224, 25, 336, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 146, 340, 211, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 483
8
52, 10, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 111,
103, 79, 125,
58, 16, 74,
8, 9, 1
134, 148, 0, 131, 128,
149, 10, 72, 73, 105,
57, 9, 143, 135, 107,
93, 217, 34, 176, 76,
114, 19, 161, 59, 80
257, 184, 428, 202, 264, 312, 138, 133, 232, 364,
504, 272, 119, 342, 124, 66, 308, 381, 161, 359,
127, 165, 224, 25, 336, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 146, 340, 211, 32, 63, 317, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 147
9
10, 52, 14,
55, 25, 15
18, 6, 111,
103, 125, 8,
79, 74, 68,
58, 16, 1
0, 128, 127, 80, 118,
168, 9, 72, 10, 114,
161, 149, 134, 131, 217,
107, 192, 176, 105, 97,
53, 214, 143, 170, 19
381, 202, 428, 184, 264, 312, 504, 133, 138, 257,
119, 364, 272, 66, 232, 342, 359, 124, 161, 127,
165, 308, 224, 336, 25, 469, 293, 349, 356, 7,
319, 418, 234, 340, 146, 211, 32, 317, 63, 305,
204, 299, 240, 360, 1, 487, 249, 92, 407, 170, 246
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Table 4: Sensitive neurons on 10 targeted adversarial example sets in conv13 and
fc layer of VGG-16 on CIFAR-10.
Target Label conv13 fc
0
387, 220, 414, 212, 362, 8, 2, 511, 431, 440,
324, 33, 291, 54, 461, 9, 478, 67, 280, 60,
374, 143, 480, 188, 462, 364, 219, 162, 381, 226,
114, 370, 46, 16, 389, 256, 115, 140, 287, 179,
124, 176, 506, 152, 371, 353, 167, 84, 459, 209
0, 1, 6, 8, 9, 5, 7, 3, 4, 2
1
84, 462, 256, 431, 105, 283, 341, 410, 79, 108,
465, 371, 403, 138, 147, 45, 125, 124, 123, 184,
353, 175, 136, 445, 372, 328, 225, 385, 257, 221,
85, 327, 485, 440, 274, 167, 407, 305, 340, 347,
483, 325, 212, 383, 392, 486, 460, 240, 334, 269
1, 8, 4, 9, 7, 6, 2, 5, 3, 0
2
389, 334, 462, 490, 420, 442, 466, 65, 344, 257,
468, 145, 72, 407, 265, 162, 318, 288, 267, 146,
347, 511, 122, 351, 179, 88, 365, 161, 186, 460,
371, 383, 409, 359, 82, 2, 25, 435, 54, 185, 445,
78, 17, 489, 294, 51, 361, 222, 493, 190, 68
2, 8, 1, 9, 0, 3, 7, 6, 4, 5
3
462, 140, 64, 36, 161, 485, 209, 392, 327, 102,
320, 162, 55, 368, 191, 423, 409, 84, 309, 391,
330, 435, 7, 307, 467, 486, 426, 175, 492, 493,
2, 484, 427, 79, 371, 34, 201, 389, 344, 411,
263, 498, 5, 273, 288, 85, 185, 359, 10, 361
3, 1, 8, 9, 4, 0, 7, 6, 5, 2
4
179, 431, 372, 315, 340, 385, 419, 149, 364, 221,
409, 263, 462, 487, 485, 496, 353, 219, 129, 448,
490, 185, 162, 509, 302, 79, 274, 327, 138, 156,
481, 278, 44, 277, 203, 139, 145, 404, 362, 15,
394, 39, 399, 428, 208, 479, 95, 239, 288, 77
4, 1, 9, 8, 7, 2, 3, 6, 5, 0
5
384, 84, 466, 291, 335, 371, 33, 353, 394, 191,
490, 354, 209, 309, 123, 359, 67, 203, 101, 186,
72, 269, 187, 460, 179, 286, 134, 483, 221, 279,
34, 362, 372, 333, 481, 387, 283, 325, 392, 61,
440, 287, 272, 85, 25, 462, 97, 267, 364, 504
5, 1, 6, 4, 9, 2, 8, 0, 7, 3
6
340, 283, 372, 188, 460, 15, 108, 288, 155, 487,
107, 262, 496, 334, 182, 77, 500, 332, 353, 162,
282, 149, 378, 485, 185, 17, 201, 389, 291, 498,
393, 407, 431, 511, 399, 482, 417, 74, 101, 440,
428, 468, 272, 307, 381, 219, 36, 257, 256, 38
6, 1, 9, 7, 0, 8, 4, 2, 3, 5
7
283, 155, 274, 353, 407, 361, 451, 374, 291, 421,
143, 201, 33, 493, 340, 378, 307, 431, 139, 263,
326, 107, 371, 267, 348, 186, 269, 262, 158, 36,
5, 248, 118, 72, 51, 20, 65, 223, 179, 100, 59,
209, 447, 286, 299, 394, 434, 77, 206, 92, 204
7, 8, 1, 6, 9, 0, 4, 2, 5, 3
8
107, 145, 131, 26, 424, 374, 354, 261, 101, 419,
361, 499, 154, 151, 189, 362, 385, 340, 373, 67,
49, 2, 411, 170, 347, 59, 335, 5, 70, 283, 110,
497, 229, 414, 343, 14, 380, 119, 190, 232, 417,
383, 351, 398, 384, 55, 294, 392, 370, 271, 446
8, 4, 5, 1, 7, 9, 2, 6, 3, 0
9
281, 353, 164, 43, 127, 295, 509, 335, 340, 372,
137, 463, 203, 33, 175, 325, 179, 147, 138, 459,
454, 371, 91, 28, 490, 126, 272, 166, 208, 493,
381, 220, 141, 468, 196, 59, 411, 249, 274, 61,
431, 460, 266, 55, 256, 174, 369, 419, 417, 511
9, 4, 1, 6, 2, 5, 8, 7, 3, 0
